diff --git a/studio/backend/core/rag/embeddings.py b/studio/backend/core/rag/embeddings.py index 345b4dd853..47d26209b4 100644 --- a/studio/backend/core/rag/embeddings.py +++ b/studio/backend/core/rag/embeddings.py @@ -63,6 +63,87 @@ def _install_torchao_stub_once() -> None: install_torchao_windows_rocm_stub() +class UnsafeEmbeddingModelError(RuntimeError): + """Raised when the embedding model repo is flagged unsafe. A distinct type so the + llama-server fallback paths re-raise it instead of masking a security block as a + routine ST failure.""" + + +def _ambient_hf_token() -> str | None: + """The HF token the loader itself would use (HF_TOKEN env or the cached login), so + the scan can reach a gated/private repo instead of failing open. None if unavailable.""" + try: + from huggingface_hub import get_token + return get_token() + except Exception: + return None + + +def _st_module_subdirs(name: str, token: str | None) -> tuple[str, ...]: + """The module directories a SentenceTransformer load reads weights from, taken from + the repo's ``modules.json`` (each module's non-empty ``path``, e.g. ``0_Transformer``). + ST deserializes ``pytorch_model.bin`` from these dirs, so they are load roots for the + security scan: a flagged pickle directly under one must block. Returns () on any + failure (no modules.json, offline, malformed) so the guard never bricks the embedder. + """ + try: + import json + + from utils.paths import is_local_path + + if is_local_path(name): + from pathlib import Path + from utils.paths import normalize_path + + path = Path(normalize_path(name)).expanduser() / "modules.json" + if not path.is_file(): + return () + data = json.loads(path.read_text()) + else: + from huggingface_hub import hf_hub_download + from huggingface_hub.utils import EntryNotFoundError + + try: + local = hf_hub_download(name, "modules.json", token = token or None) + except EntryNotFoundError: + return () + data = json.loads(open(local).read()) + subdirs = [] + for module in data or (): + sub = str((module or {}).get("path", "")).strip().strip("/") + if sub: + subdirs.append(sub) + return tuple(dict.fromkeys(subdirs)) + except Exception: + return () + + +def _guard_model_security(name: str) -> None: + """Refuse to load a repo HF flagged as unsafe: a poisoned pickle deserializes inside + SentenceTransformer regardless of trust_remote_code. Defense in depth behind the + /settings gate (a name can also arrive via env/default); local paths and unreachable + scans fail open inside evaluate_file_security. Never bricks the embedder on a gate error. + """ + try: + from utils.security import evaluate_file_security, security_load_subdirs + + token = _ambient_hf_token() + # Union the audio-model load roots with the ST module dirs so a flagged pickle + # directly under a Transformer module dir (0_Transformer/) blocks instead of + # passing as an unreferenced nested shard. + load_subdirs = tuple( + dict.fromkeys((*security_load_subdirs(name, token), *_st_module_subdirs(name, token))) + ) + blocked = evaluate_file_security(name, hf_token = token, load_subdirs = load_subdirs).blocked + except Exception: + return + if blocked: + raise UnsafeEmbeddingModelError( + f"Embedding model {name!r} is flagged as unsafe by Hugging Face's security " + "scan; refusing to load. Set a different RAG embedding model." + ) + + def _get(model_name: str | None = None): """Cached SentenceTransformer, (re)loading on a name change. Loaded in fp16 for a ~1.5x speedup at negligible accuracy loss.""" @@ -75,6 +156,7 @@ def _get(model_name: str | None = None): device = _device() logger.info("loading embedding model %s on %s", name, device) + _guard_model_security(name) _model = SentenceTransformer( name, device = device, model_kwargs = {"torch_dtype": "float16"} ) @@ -159,6 +241,8 @@ class _SentenceTransformersBackend: ): try: return _st_encode(texts, model_name = model_name, normalize = normalize) + except UnsafeEmbeddingModelError: + raise # a security block must hard-fail, not fall back to llama-server except Exception as st_err: # noqa: BLE001 - runtime ST/CUDA encode failure # ST loaded but this encode blew up; swap the process to the llama-server # embedder (so later encodes stay in one space) and retry. @@ -222,6 +306,8 @@ def _build_st_backend_or_fallback(): try: backend.warm(model_name = None) return backend + except UnsafeEmbeddingModelError: + raise # a security block must hard-fail, not fall back to llama-server except Exception as st_err: # noqa: BLE001 - any ST/torch import or load failure fallback = _try_make_llama_backend() if fallback is None: @@ -290,6 +376,37 @@ def _reset_backend() -> None: _backend_key = None +def active_backend_is_llama() -> bool: + """True when this process actually embeds via the llama-server (GGUF) backend. + + Reflects the ACTUAL built backend once one exists: an ``auto`` install that + resolves to sentence-transformers but then falls back to llama-server at + runtime (``_build_st_backend_or_fallback`` on a torch/CUDA load failure, or + ``_switch_to_llama_fallback`` on an encode failure) loads only inert GGUF, so + callers gating on the ST pickle must see llama here. Before any backend is + built, defers to the resolver (``auto`` -> ``_resolve_auto()``, else the raw + key) exactly as a fresh process would. Never raises: a backend probe must not + block saving a model.""" + try: + with _backend_lock: + backend = _backend + if backend is not None: + # A backend exists: report what it ACTUALLY is. A concrete + # sentence-transformers backend must return False even if the + # resolver would now pick llama, so its pickle stays gated. If the + # llama import fails we cannot be llama, so fall to the safe False. + try: + from .embed_llama_server import LlamaServerBackend + except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - llama plumbing import must never block + return False + return isinstance(backend, LlamaServerBackend) + raw = (config.EMBED_BACKEND or "auto").strip().lower() + key = _resolve_auto() if raw in _AUTO_ALIASES else raw + return key in _LLAMA_ALIASES + except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - a backend probe must never block saving + return False + + def warm(model_name: str | None = None) -> None: """Eagerly load the embedder so the first real request isn't slow.""" _get_backend().warm(model_name = model_name) diff --git a/studio/backend/routes/settings.py b/studio/backend/routes/settings.py index 862bce8be8..914699f540 100644 --- a/studio/backend/routes/settings.py +++ b/studio/backend/routes/settings.py @@ -260,17 +260,29 @@ def _embedding_model_response() -> EmbeddingModelResponse: ) -def _llama_backend_active() -> bool: - """True when this install embeds via the llama-server (GGUF) backend.""" - from core.rag import config as rag_config - from core.rag import embeddings - +def _ambient_hf_token() -> Optional[str]: + """The HF token the loader would use (HF_TOKEN env or the cached login), so a gated + repo is scanned rather than failing open. None if unavailable.""" try: - raw = (rag_config.EMBED_BACKEND or "auto").strip().lower() - key = embeddings._resolve_auto() if raw in embeddings._AUTO_ALIASES else raw + from huggingface_hub import get_token + return get_token() + except Exception: + return None + + +def _llama_backend_active() -> bool: + """True when this install actually embeds via the llama-server (GGUF) backend. + + Delegates to the embeddings module so a runtime fallback from + sentence-transformers to llama-server (after a torch/CUDA load or encode + failure) is honored: in that state the process loads only inert GGUF, so the + ST pickle gate below must not hard-block a repo whose GGUF companion is clean. + Before any backend is built this still reflects the resolver.""" + from core.rag import embeddings + try: + return embeddings.active_backend_is_llama() except Exception: # noqa: BLE001 - backend probe must never block saving return False - return key in embeddings._LLAMA_ALIASES def _resolves_as_local_gguf(model: str) -> bool: @@ -357,6 +369,8 @@ def update_embedding_model( """Set the RAG embedding model. Unless ``force`` is set, the repo is verified to be an embedding model via HF metadata; an unverifiable model (wrong type, typo, gated repo, or no network) returns 409 so the UI can offer "save anyway". + A repo flagged unsafe by HF's security scan returns 403 instead: a hard block + that ``force`` cannot bypass, so the UI must not offer "save anyway". Documents indexed under the previous model must be re-uploaded.""" from utils.models import is_embedding_model @@ -370,15 +384,51 @@ def update_embedding_model( event = "settings.update_embedding_model_failed", log = logger, ) from exc + hf_token = (payload.hf_token or "").strip() or None # The env/default model needs no verification; saving it is a no-op override. # A local GGUF on the llama-server backend is accepted as-is: it is exactly # what the backend loads, and HF metadata cannot verify a local path. - if ( - model != default_embedding_model() - and not payload.force - and not (_llama_backend_active() and _resolves_as_local_gguf(model)) - ): - hf_token = (payload.hf_token or "").strip() or None + is_local_gguf = _llama_backend_active() and _resolves_as_local_gguf(model) + # The pickle gate only matters for the sentence-transformers backend, which is what + # deserializes pickles. On the llama-server backend the embedder loads GGUF files + # (inert) from effective_gguf_repo(), so scanning the ST repo's pickle here would + # wrongly reject a custom repo whose GGUF companion is clean; the GGUF availability + # checks below cover that path instead. + scan_st_pickle = ( + model != default_embedding_model() and not is_local_gguf and not _llama_backend_active() + ) + if scan_st_pickle: + # Malware/pickle gate before we persist a repo the embedder later loads with + # SentenceTransformer. Runs even under force (force only skips the is-embedding + # type check for offline/local repos HF cannot verify); local paths and + # unreachable scans fail open inside evaluate_file_security. + from utils.security import evaluate_file_security, security_load_subdirs + from core.rag.embeddings import _st_module_subdirs + + # Fall back to the loader's own token so a gated/private repo is actually scanned + # (a token-less scan fails open for exactly the repo that would still load). + scan_token = hf_token or _ambient_hf_token() + # Include the ST module dirs (0_Transformer/) so a flagged pickle directly under + # one blocks instead of passing as an unreferenced nested shard. + load_subdirs = tuple( + dict.fromkeys( + ( + *security_load_subdirs(model, scan_token), + *_st_module_subdirs(model, scan_token), + ) + ) + ) + if evaluate_file_security(model, hf_token = scan_token, load_subdirs = load_subdirs).blocked: + # 403, not 409: the client routes every 409 into the forceable "save anyway" + # flow, but this block is a hard, non-forceable security refusal. + raise HTTPException( + status_code = 403, + detail = ( + f"{model!r} is flagged as unsafe by Hugging Face's security scan and " + "cannot be used as the embedding model." + ), + ) + if model != default_embedding_model() and not payload.force and not is_local_gguf: from core.rag import config as rag_config # A GGUF-named repo on the llama-server backend is loaded from its .gguf diff --git a/studio/backend/tests/test_embedding_model_security_gate.py b/studio/backend/tests/test_embedding_model_security_gate.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..940b35d7ba --- /dev/null +++ b/studio/backend/tests/test_embedding_model_security_gate.py @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: AGPL-3.0-only +# Copyright 2026-present the Unsloth AI Inc. team. All rights reserved. See /studio/LICENSE.AGPL-3.0 + +"""The RAG embedding model must pass the malware/pickle gate before it is persisted or +loaded. A flagged repo (or any repo saved with force) previously reached +SentenceTransformer unscanned, bypassing the normal model-load protections.""" + +from pathlib import Path +import sys +import types as _types + + +_BACKEND_DIR = str(Path(__file__).resolve().parent.parent) +if _BACKEND_DIR not in sys.path: + sys.path.insert(0, _BACKEND_DIR) + +_loggers_stub = _types.ModuleType("loggers") +_loggers_stub.get_logger = lambda name: __import__("logging").getLogger(name) +sys.modules.setdefault("loggers", _loggers_stub) + +import pytest +from fastapi import FastAPI +from fastapi.testclient import TestClient + +import routes.settings as settings + + +class _Decision: + def __init__(self, blocked): + self.blocked = blocked + + +def _security_stub(blocked): + mod = _types.ModuleType("utils.security") + mod.evaluate_file_security = lambda *a, **k: _Decision(blocked) + mod.security_load_subdirs = lambda *a, **k: () + return mod + + +@pytest.fixture +def client(monkeypatch): + # The settings scan unions in the ST module dirs read from modules.json; keep it + # offline and deterministic for the endpoint tests that use this fixture. + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_st_module_subdirs", lambda name, token = None: ()) + saved: dict = {} + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "default_embedding_model", lambda: "unsloth/default-embed") + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "validate_embedding_model", lambda v: v) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "set_rag_embedding_model", lambda v: saved.setdefault("model", v)) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "_llama_backend_active", lambda: False) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "_resolves_as_local_gguf", lambda m: False) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "get_rag_embedding_model", lambda: saved.get("model", "")) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "get_stored_embedding_model", lambda: saved.get("model")) + + app = FastAPI() + app.include_router(settings.router) + app.dependency_overrides[settings.get_current_subject] = lambda: "admin" + return TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions = False), saved + + +def test_flagged_repo_is_blocked_even_with_force(client, monkeypatch): + c, saved = client + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", _security_stub(blocked = True)) + r = c.put( + "/embedding-model", json = {"embedding_model": "attacker/malicious-embed", "force": True} + ) + # 403, not the forceable 409, so the client does not offer "save anyway". + assert r.status_code == 403 + assert "model" not in saved # force must not persist a flagged repo + + +def test_flagged_repo_is_blocked_without_force(client, monkeypatch): + c, saved = client + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", _security_stub(blocked = True)) + r = c.put("/embedding-model", json = {"embedding_model": "attacker/malicious-embed"}) + assert r.status_code == 403 + assert "model" not in saved + + +def test_hard_block_uses_non_forceable_status(client, monkeypatch): + # The forceable verification path uses 409; the hard security block must be distinct + # (403) so the frontend never routes it into the "save anyway" force flow. + c, _saved = client + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", _security_stub(blocked = True)) + blocked = c.put("/embedding-model", json = {"embedding_model": "attacker/malicious-embed"}) + assert blocked.status_code == 403 + + # A verification failure (not-an-embedding-model) stays forceable at 409. + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", _security_stub(blocked = False)) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "is_embedding_model", lambda *a, **k: False, raising = False) + import utils.models as _models + + monkeypatch.setattr(_models, "is_embedding_model", lambda *a, **k: False) + unverified = c.put("/embedding-model", json = {"embedding_model": "acme/not-an-embedder"}) + assert unverified.status_code == 409 + + +def test_llama_backend_skips_the_st_pickle_scan(monkeypatch): + # On the llama-server backend the embedder loads GGUF (inert), not the ST repo's + # pickle, so a flagged ST repo with a clean GGUF companion must not be rejected here. + saved: dict = {} + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "default_embedding_model", lambda: "unsloth/default-embed") + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "validate_embedding_model", lambda v: v) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "set_rag_embedding_model", lambda v: saved.setdefault("model", v)) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "_llama_backend_active", lambda: True) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "_resolves_as_local_gguf", lambda m: False) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "get_rag_embedding_model", lambda: saved.get("model", "")) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "get_stored_embedding_model", lambda: saved.get("model")) + # force skips the GGUF availability checks; the ST pickle gate is what we assert is skipped. + called = {"scanned": False} + mod = _types.ModuleType("utils.security") + + def _fail(*a, **k): + called["scanned"] = True + return _Decision(True) + + mod.evaluate_file_security = _fail + mod.security_load_subdirs = lambda *a, **k: () + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", mod) + + app = FastAPI() + app.include_router(settings.router) + app.dependency_overrides[settings.get_current_subject] = lambda: "admin" + c = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions = False) + r = c.put( + "/embedding-model", + json = {"embedding_model": "attacker/flagged-st-clean-gguf", "force": True}, + ) + assert r.status_code == 200 + assert called["scanned"] is False # the ST pickle scan never ran on the llama path + assert saved.get("model") == "attacker/flagged-st-clean-gguf" + + +def test_runtime_llama_fallback_skips_the_st_pickle_scan(monkeypatch): + # auto resolves to sentence-transformers (GPU present) but the embedder fell back to + # llama-server at runtime (torch/CUDA load or encode failure), so the process now loads + # only inert GGUF. The real _llama_backend_active() must reflect that cached fallback, + # so a flagged ST repo with a clean GGUF companion must not be hard-blocked here. + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + from core.rag.embed_llama_server import LlamaServerBackend + + # Simulate the runtime fallback: the process-wide backend is a LlamaServerBackend even + # though the auto resolver would still say sentence-transformers. + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_backend", LlamaServerBackend()) + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_resolve_auto", lambda: "sentence-transformers") + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_st_module_subdirs", lambda name, token = None: ()) + + saved: dict = {} + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "default_embedding_model", lambda: "unsloth/default-embed") + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "validate_embedding_model", lambda v: v) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "set_rag_embedding_model", lambda v: saved.setdefault("model", v)) + # Deliberately do NOT monkeypatch settings._llama_backend_active: this test exercises the + # real delegation to embeddings.active_backend_is_llama() so the cached fallback is honored. + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "_resolves_as_local_gguf", lambda m: False) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "get_rag_embedding_model", lambda: saved.get("model", "")) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "get_stored_embedding_model", lambda: saved.get("model")) + + called = {"scanned": False} + mod = _types.ModuleType("utils.security") + + def _fail(*a, **k): + called["scanned"] = True + return _Decision(True) + + mod.evaluate_file_security = _fail + mod.security_load_subdirs = lambda *a, **k: () + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", mod) + + app = FastAPI() + app.include_router(settings.router) + app.dependency_overrides[settings.get_current_subject] = lambda: "admin" + c = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions = False) + r = c.put( + "/embedding-model", + json = {"embedding_model": "attacker/flagged-st-clean-gguf", "force": True}, + ) + assert r.status_code == 200 + assert called["scanned"] is False # the ST pickle scan never ran on the llama fallback + assert saved.get("model") == "attacker/flagged-st-clean-gguf" + + +def test_active_backend_is_llama_reflects_cache_and_resolver(monkeypatch): + # active_backend_is_llama() reports the ACTUAL built backend when one exists, and defers + # to the resolver (fresh-process behavior) when none has been built yet. + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + import core.rag.config as rag_config + from core.rag.embed_llama_server import LlamaServerBackend + + # A cached llama backend wins even when auto would resolve to sentence-transformers. + monkeypatch.setattr(rag_config, "EMBED_BACKEND", "auto") + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_resolve_auto", lambda: "sentence-transformers") + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_backend", LlamaServerBackend()) + assert embeddings.active_backend_is_llama() is True + + # A cached ST backend reports False even when the resolver now picks llama, so its + # pickle stays gated (the cached backend, not the resolver, is what actually embeds). + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_resolve_auto", lambda: "llama-server") + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_backend", embeddings._SentenceTransformersBackend()) + assert embeddings.active_backend_is_llama() is False + + # No cached backend -> the resolver decides, unchanged from before. + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_resolve_auto", lambda: "sentence-transformers") + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_backend", None) + assert embeddings.active_backend_is_llama() is False # auto -> sentence-transformers + + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_resolve_auto", lambda: "llama-server") + assert embeddings.active_backend_is_llama() is True # auto -> llama-server + + # An explicit (non-auto) key is honored verbatim without a cached backend. + monkeypatch.setattr(rag_config, "EMBED_BACKEND", "llama-server") + assert embeddings.active_backend_is_llama() is True + + +def test_settings_scan_scopes_module_subdirs(monkeypatch): + # The settings scan must pass the ST module dirs (0_Transformer/) as load roots so a + # pickle directly under one blocks; assert those subdirs reach evaluate_file_security. + saved: dict = {} + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "default_embedding_model", lambda: "unsloth/default-embed") + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "validate_embedding_model", lambda v: v) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "set_rag_embedding_model", lambda v: saved.setdefault("model", v)) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "_llama_backend_active", lambda: False) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "_resolves_as_local_gguf", lambda m: False) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "get_rag_embedding_model", lambda: saved.get("model", "")) + monkeypatch.setattr(settings, "get_stored_embedding_model", lambda: saved.get("model")) + + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + + monkeypatch.setattr( + embeddings, "_st_module_subdirs", lambda name, token = None: ("0_Transformer",) + ) + seen = {} + + def _capture(*a, **k): + seen["subdirs"] = tuple(k.get("load_subdirs") or ()) + return _Decision(False) + + mod = _types.ModuleType("utils.security") + mod.security_load_subdirs = lambda *a, **k: () + mod.evaluate_file_security = _capture + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", mod) + + app = FastAPI() + app.include_router(settings.router) + app.dependency_overrides[settings.get_current_subject] = lambda: "admin" + c = TestClient(app, raise_server_exceptions = False) + r = c.put( + "/embedding-model", json = {"embedding_model": "acme/embed-with-module-dir", "force": True} + ) + assert r.status_code == 200 + assert "0_Transformer" in seen["subdirs"] + + +def test_clean_repo_saves_under_force(client, monkeypatch): + c, saved = client + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", _security_stub(blocked = False)) + r = c.put("/embedding-model", json = {"embedding_model": "acme/clean-embed", "force": True}) + assert r.status_code == 200 + assert saved.get("model") == "acme/clean-embed" + + +def test_load_sink_refuses_flagged_model(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", _security_stub(blocked = True)) + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + with pytest.raises(embeddings.UnsafeEmbeddingModelError): + embeddings._guard_model_security("attacker/malicious-embed") + + +def test_load_sink_allows_clean_model(monkeypatch): + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", _security_stub(blocked = False)) + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + embeddings._guard_model_security("acme/clean-embed") # no raise + + +def test_sink_threads_ambient_token_into_scan(monkeypatch): + # A gated repo set via env/default has no request token; the guard must feed the + # loader's own token to the scan, or it fails open for the repo that still loads. + seen = {} + mod = _types.ModuleType("utils.security") + mod.security_load_subdirs = ( + lambda name, token = None: seen.setdefault("subdirs_token", token) or () + ) + mod.evaluate_file_security = lambda *a, **k: seen.setdefault( + "scan_token", k.get("hf_token") + ) or _Decision(False) + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", mod) + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_ambient_hf_token", lambda: "hf_ambient") + embeddings._guard_model_security("acme/gated-embed") + assert seen["scan_token"] == "hf_ambient" + assert seen["subdirs_token"] == "hf_ambient" + + +def test_sink_scopes_st_module_subdirs_into_scan(monkeypatch): + # A flagged pickle directly under a Transformer module dir (0_Transformer/) must + # reach the scan as a load root; assert the guard unions the module dirs into + # load_subdirs so evaluate_file_security treats such a pickle as root-level. + seen = {} + + def _capture(*a, **k): + seen["subdirs"] = tuple(k.get("load_subdirs") or ()) + return _Decision(False) + + mod = _types.ModuleType("utils.security") + mod.security_load_subdirs = lambda name, token = None: () + mod.evaluate_file_security = _capture + monkeypatch.setitem(sys.modules, "utils.security", mod) + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_ambient_hf_token", lambda: None) + monkeypatch.setattr( + embeddings, "_st_module_subdirs", lambda name, token = None: ("0_Transformer",) + ) + embeddings._guard_model_security("acme/embed-with-module-dir") + assert "0_Transformer" in seen["subdirs"] + + +def test_st_module_subdirs_reads_local_modules_json(tmp_path, monkeypatch): + # The helper must parse each module's non-empty "path" from a local repo's + # modules.json and drop the root-level ("") Transformer entry. + import json + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + + (tmp_path / "modules.json").write_text( + json.dumps( + [ + {"idx": 0, "name": "0", "path": "0_Transformer", "type": "..."}, + {"idx": 1, "name": "1", "path": "1_Pooling", "type": "..."}, + {"idx": 2, "name": "2", "path": "", "type": "..."}, + ] + ) + ) + subdirs = embeddings._st_module_subdirs(str(tmp_path), None) + assert subdirs == ("0_Transformer", "1_Pooling") + + +def test_st_module_subdirs_swallows_errors(monkeypatch): + # Any failure (no modules.json, offline, malformed) returns () so the guard never + # bricks the embedder. + import huggingface_hub + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + + def _boom(*a, **k): + raise RuntimeError("offline") + + monkeypatch.setattr(huggingface_hub, "hf_hub_download", _boom) + assert embeddings._st_module_subdirs("acme/no-such-repo-xyz", None) == () + + +def test_security_block_is_not_swallowed_by_llama_fallback(monkeypatch): + # The ST encode fallback must re-raise a security block, not swap to llama-server. + import core.rag.embeddings as embeddings + + def _boom(*a, **k): + raise embeddings.UnsafeEmbeddingModelError("flagged") + + monkeypatch.setattr(embeddings, "_st_encode", _boom) + monkeypatch.setattr( + embeddings, + "_switch_to_llama_fallback", + lambda err: pytest.fail("security block must not fall back to llama-server"), + ) + with pytest.raises(embeddings.UnsafeEmbeddingModelError): + embeddings._SentenceTransformersBackend().encode(["hi"]) diff --git a/studio/backend/tests/test_security_gate_consistency.py b/studio/backend/tests/test_security_gate_consistency.py index db66df8a30..b5f1069f12 100644 --- a/studio/backend/tests/test_security_gate_consistency.py +++ b/studio/backend/tests/test_security_gate_consistency.py @@ -99,3 +99,16 @@ def test_malware_and_consent_gates_cover_the_lora_base(): if runs_gate and not resolves_base: offenders.append(f"{rel} runs a load gate but never resolves the LoRA base") assert not offenders, "\n".join(offenders) + + +def test_rag_embedding_path_runs_the_malware_gate(): + """The RAG embedding model is set through /settings and later loaded by + SentenceTransformer, which deserializes pickles; both sites must run the malware gate + or a flagged repo loads unscanned (bypassing the normal model-load protections).""" + offenders = [] + for rel in ("routes/settings.py", "core/rag/embeddings.py"): + if "evaluate_file_security(" not in (_BACKEND / rel).read_text(): + offenders.append( + f"{rel} loads/persists an embedding model without evaluate_file_security" + ) + assert not offenders, "\n".join(offenders) diff --git a/studio/frontend/src/features/settings/api/embedding-model.ts b/studio/frontend/src/features/settings/api/embedding-model.ts index 8b6bc7ee7f..9a61142f73 100644 --- a/studio/frontend/src/features/settings/api/embedding-model.ts +++ b/studio/frontend/src/features/settings/api/embedding-model.ts @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ type ApiEmbeddingModelSettings = { * (wrong type, gated repo, or offline). Retry with force to save anyway. */ export class EmbeddingModelVerificationError extends Error {} +/** 403 from the backend: the repo is flagged unsafe by Hugging Face's security scan. + * A hard block; force cannot bypass it, so it must not enter the "save anyway" flow. */ +export class EmbeddingModelBlockedError extends Error {} + function fromApi(settings: ApiEmbeddingModelSettings): EmbeddingModelSettings { return { embeddingModel: settings.embedding_model, @@ -56,6 +60,11 @@ export async function updateEmbeddingModelSettings( force: options?.force ?? false, }), }); + if (res.status === 403) { + throw new EmbeddingModelBlockedError( + await readFastApiError(res, "This model is blocked by a security scan"), + ); + } if (res.status === 409) { throw new EmbeddingModelVerificationError( await readFastApiError(res, "Could not verify the embedding model"), diff --git a/studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/general-tab.tsx b/studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/general-tab.tsx index 7670aae5fa..8fd70cc1b7 100644 --- a/studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/general-tab.tsx +++ b/studio/frontend/src/features/settings/tabs/general-tab.tsx @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ import { updatePreviewSharing, } from "../api/preview-sharing"; import { + EmbeddingModelBlockedError, type EmbeddingModelSettings, EmbeddingModelVerificationError, loadEmbeddingModelSettings, @@ -410,7 +411,10 @@ export function GeneralTab() { description: t("settings.general.rag.reindexWarning"), }); } catch (error) { - if (error instanceof EmbeddingModelVerificationError) { + // A hard security block cannot be forced; keep the "save anyway" action hidden. + if (error instanceof EmbeddingModelBlockedError) { + setEmbeddingModelNeedsForce(false); + } else if (error instanceof EmbeddingModelVerificationError) { setEmbeddingModelNeedsForce(true); } setEmbeddingModelError(