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* Scope tasks to authorization context, not session Tasks were keyed by the transport-layer Mcp-Session-Id, which is server-assigned and changes on reconnect — so clients lost access to their running tasks after any connection interruption. The MCP spec says tasks should be bound to authorization context, not session. This replaces session_id with task_scope (derived from AccessToken.client_id, URL-encoded) in all task data Redis keys and Docket task keys. When no auth is configured, a "_" sentinel is used and security comes from UUID task ID entropy per the spec. Session ID is still used for transport-level concerns (notification queues, subscriber registration) and is now stored in the TaskContextSnapshot payload so background workers can still deliver notifications. Also extracts all the task context infrastructure (TaskContextInfo, TaskContextSnapshot, snapshot loading, session/server registries) from server/dependencies.py into a new server/tasks/context.py to keep the DI module from sprawling further. Closes #3758 🤖 Generated with Claude Code Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Rename _redis_key to _snapshot_redis_key Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Document in-process session registry as an optimization Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Tidy imports and docstrings Hoist imports where safe, keep subscriptions/notifications deferred in handlers.py since they pull in docket at module level. Sharpen docstrings on keys.py and context.py so each module owns its lane. Clean up the re-export block in dependencies.py. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Fix misleading comment on re-export block Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> * Tighten task scope: include sub claim, partition keyspaces Addresses review feedback on #3800: - Compose task scope from client_id and the JWT sub claim (when present) so fixed-OAuth deployments isolate per user, not just per client. - Replace the "_" anonymous sentinel with a tagged keyspace partition. Docket keys are now auth:{enc_scope}:... or anon:..., and Redis keys use fastmcp:task:auth:{enc_scope}:... or fastmcp:task:anon:..., routed through a single task_redis_prefix() helper. - get_task_scope() returns the raw scope (or None); encoding happens once at the keys.py boundary, collapsing the previous double-quote invariant. - Drop the dormant fallback in notifications.py that routed input_required relays into the anon keyspace when task_scope was missing -- log and skip instead. - Add comprehensive parser/encoder tests in test_task_keys.py covering round-trips, malformed keys, and adversarial scopes ("anon", "_", and scopes containing : / | %). - Add cross-scope rejection tests: distinct client_ids, distinct sub claims under a shared client_id, and authenticated vs anonymous. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
149 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
149 lines
4.9 KiB
Python
"""
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Tests for authorization-based task isolation (CRITICAL SECURITY).
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Ensures that tasks are properly scoped to authorization identity and clients
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cannot access each other's tasks.
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"""
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import pytest
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from mcp.server.auth.middleware.auth_context import (
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auth_context_var,
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)
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from mcp.server.auth.middleware.bearer_auth import AuthenticatedUser
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from fastmcp import FastMCP
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from fastmcp.client import Client
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from fastmcp.server.auth import AccessToken
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@pytest.fixture
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def task_server():
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"""Create a server with background tasks enabled."""
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mcp = FastMCP("security-test-server")
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@mcp.tool(task=True)
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async def secret_tool(data: str) -> str:
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"""A tool that processes sensitive data."""
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return f"Secret result: {data}"
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return mcp
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async def test_same_client_can_access_all_its_tasks(task_server: FastMCP):
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"""A single authenticated client can access all tasks it created."""
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token = AccessToken(
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token="token-a",
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client_id="client-a",
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scopes=["read"],
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)
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reset = auth_context_var.set(AuthenticatedUser(token))
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try:
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async with Client(task_server) as client:
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task1 = await client.call_tool(
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"secret_tool", {"data": "first"}, task=True, task_id="task-1"
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)
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task2 = await client.call_tool(
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"secret_tool", {"data": "second"}, task=True, task_id="task-2"
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)
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await task1.wait(timeout=2.0)
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await task2.wait(timeout=2.0)
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result1 = await task1.result()
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result2 = await task2.result()
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assert "first" in str(result1.data)
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assert "second" in str(result2.data)
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finally:
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auth_context_var.reset(reset)
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async def test_unauthenticated_client_can_access_its_tasks(task_server: FastMCP):
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"""An unauthenticated client can access tasks it created (by task ID)."""
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async with Client(task_server) as client:
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task = await client.call_tool(
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"secret_tool", {"data": "hello"}, task=True, task_id="my-task"
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)
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await task.wait(timeout=2.0)
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result = await task.result()
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assert "hello" in str(result.data)
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def _set_auth(client_id: str, sub: str | None = None):
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"""Install an auth context for a given client_id/sub. Returns the reset token."""
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claims = {"sub": sub} if sub else {}
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token = AccessToken(
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token=f"token-{client_id}-{sub or ''}",
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client_id=client_id,
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scopes=["read"],
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claims=claims,
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)
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return auth_context_var.set(AuthenticatedUser(token))
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async def _submit_task_id(client: Client, data: str) -> str:
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"""Submit a background task and return its server-assigned task id."""
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task = await client.call_tool("secret_tool", {"data": data}, task=True)
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await task.wait(timeout=2.0)
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return task.task_id
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async def test_distinct_clients_cannot_access_each_others_tasks(
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task_server: FastMCP,
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):
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"""Two distinct authenticated clients live in disjoint scopes — looking up
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a peer's task id returns 'not found'."""
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reset = _set_auth("client-a")
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try:
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async with Client(task_server) as client_a:
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task_id = await _submit_task_id(client_a, "client-a-secret")
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finally:
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auth_context_var.reset(reset)
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reset = _set_auth("client-b")
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try:
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async with Client(task_server) as client_b:
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with pytest.raises(Exception, match="not found"):
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await client_b.get_task_status(task_id)
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finally:
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auth_context_var.reset(reset)
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async def test_distinct_subs_same_client_id_cannot_access_each_others_tasks(
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task_server: FastMCP,
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):
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"""Fixed-OAuth case: two users share a client_id but have distinct ``sub``
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claims. The ``sub``-aware scope must still isolate them."""
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shared_client = "shared-oauth-app"
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reset = _set_auth(shared_client, sub="user-alice")
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try:
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async with Client(task_server) as alice:
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task_id = await _submit_task_id(alice, "alice-secret")
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finally:
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auth_context_var.reset(reset)
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reset = _set_auth(shared_client, sub="user-bob")
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try:
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async with Client(task_server) as bob:
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with pytest.raises(Exception, match="not found"):
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await bob.get_task_status(task_id)
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finally:
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auth_context_var.reset(reset)
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async def test_authenticated_and_anonymous_keyspaces_are_disjoint(
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task_server: FastMCP,
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):
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"""An anonymous client must not be able to read an authenticated client's
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tasks (and vice versa) even when colliding on task id."""
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reset = _set_auth("client-a")
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try:
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async with Client(task_server) as authed:
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authed_task_id = await _submit_task_id(authed, "authed-secret")
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finally:
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auth_context_var.reset(reset)
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async with Client(task_server) as anon:
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with pytest.raises(Exception, match="not found"):
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await anon.get_task_status(authed_task_id)
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