* Add server-side SEP-990 identity assertion (ID-JAG)
* Test SEP-990 identity assertion token endpoint
* Format identity assertion test
* Document SEP-990 identity assertion
* Thread identity_assertion through OIDCProxy
* Harden ID-JAG: authoritative scopes and grant-type enforcement
Scopes for the issued token now derive only from the signed assertion (or server policy when it omits scopes); the client-supplied request scope may narrow but never widen them. Enforce the registered grant-type constraint the SDK check bypassed, and have proxy DCR add the jwt-bearer grant to registered clients when identity assertion is enabled.
* Harden ID-JAG: honor nbf, reject non-object payload, bound jti cache, preserve required_scopes
* Document per-process ID-JAG replay limitation and nbf check
* Harden ID-JAG round 3: resource indicator, non-object header, algorithm config
- Honor RFC 8707 resource on the jwt-bearer grant (invalid_target on
mismatch), mirroring authorize()'s invariant incl. skip-when-unconfigured
- Reject JSON-array JOSE headers with invalid_grant instead of a 500
- Add IdentityAssertion.algorithm so ES256/PS256 issuers can be verified
(JWTVerifier otherwise defaults to RS256)
* Bind ID-JAG exchange to the assertion's signed client_id and resource
SEP-990: the IdP signs which client and which resource the assertion was
minted for. With public proxy clients the presented client_id is
self-asserted, so the signed binding is what stops client B redeeming
client A's leaked assertion — and the signed resource claim stops an
assertion for server A being redeemed at server B behind the same IdP.
* Harden ID-JAG round 4: check bindings before jti consumption; validate temporal claims, algorithm, and discovery body
- Move the client_id/resource binding checks into the validator itself,
before jti is recorded as consumed, so an assertion presented with the
wrong binding is rejected without burning replay protection for whoever
it actually belongs to
- Reject non-numeric exp/iat/nbf with invalid_grant instead of a 500
- Validate IdentityAssertion.algorithm at config time (must be an
asymmetric JWS algorithm verifiable via JWKS)
- Reject a non-object OIDC discovery body with invalid_grant instead of a 500
- Centralize the resource-URL comparison helpers used by both the
validator and OAuthProxy.authorize()
* Rebase onto httpx2/SDK b2 and harden ID-JAG round 5
- Migrate identity assertion + tests to httpx2 and the local httpx2_mock
(legacy httpx is now banned; pytest-httpx no longer intercepts)
- Add is_optional to the shared httpx2_mock, mirroring pytest-httpx
- Tighten the algorithm allowlist to JWTVerifier's exact supported set
(prefix check accepted typos like RS999 -> 500 on first exchange)
- Reject non-string jti before the cache lookup (unhashable -> 500)
- Track revocation for self-contained ID-JAG tokens: revoke_token records
the jti and load_access_token rejects it until natural expiry
- Dedupe resource-URL helpers: proxy now imports the shared
normalize_resource_url/server_url_has_query from identity_assertion
* Advertise 'none' token-endpoint auth method when ID-JAG is enabled without CIMD
DCR clients are public, so metadata consumers must see 'none' to use the
advertised jwt-bearer grant; previously only the CIMD path added it.
* Document 2026-07-28 protocol support as a distinct feature catalog
SEP-990 identity assertion leads: the SDK provides the wire contract and
provider hook; FastMCP provides the complete server-side implementation.
Inventories the full modern-era capability set for v4.
* Harden ID-JAG round 6: lazy re-export, dual-form audience, per-issuer algorithms, discovery backoff
- IdentityAssertion re-exported lazily from server.auth (the eager import
bypassed the package's documented lazy-import boundary)
- Accept the ID-JAG aud both with and without base_url's trailing slash;
metadata advertises the slashed form, so IdPs echoing it verbatim work
- algorithms={issuer: alg} per-issuer override, mirroring jwks_uris
- OIDC discovery serializes per-issuer and backs off 30s after a failure
(discovery runs pre-signature, so garbage could amplify into HTTP floods)
* Fix broken code examples in docs
- Tag error output blocks as ```text instead of ```python (anthropic,
openai integration docs + v2 mirrors)
- Quote unquoted URL in Descope config example (+ v2 mirror)
- Fix GoogleGenAISamplingHandler → GoogleGenaiSamplingHandler casing
in sampling docs
- Fix import path: handlers.GoogleGenaiSamplingHandler →
handlers.google_genai.GoogleGenaiSamplingHandler in v3-features
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Fix remaining broken doc examples and add skip tags for false positives
- BearerTokenAuth → StaticTokenVerifier in deployment/http.mdx
- providers.oauth → server.auth import in authentication.mdx
- ListToolsNext → updated list_tools API in v3-features.mdx
- OAuthClientProvider → OAuth in v2/storage-backends.mdx
- Add test="skip" for upgrade guides, contrib placeholders, f-string backticks
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Ratchet doc example baselines to zero
All 1444 examples now pass syntax and import checks.
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add pytest-examples dev dep, fix client_id in StaticTokenVerifier example, commit missed openapi fixes
- Add pytest-examples to dev dependencies (fixes CI ModuleNotFoundError)
- Include required client_id in StaticTokenVerifier token payload
- Commit previously unstaged HTTPRoute import fixes in openapi.mdx
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Update deprecated import paths across docs
- fastmcp.server.openapi → fastmcp.server.providers.openapi
- fastmcp.server.proxy → fastmcp.server.providers.proxy
- fastmcp.server.apps → fastmcp.apps
- Tag upgrade guide "Before" examples with test="skip"
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
* feat: make upstream_client_secret optional in OAuthProxy
Extract _create_upstream_oauth_client() factory method for subclass
override. Cookie signing falls back to JWT key material when no secret.
* fix: include client_id in revocation requests for public clients
* fix: use factory method for revocation auth
* Add MultiAuth for composing multiple token verification sources
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01WwKYDCqjM2FqYwY5ZNVvjb
* Fix ruff lint/format in MultiAuth tests
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01WwKYDCqjM2FqYwY5ZNVvjb
* Fix MultiAuth well-known route delegation and empty scopes handling
🤖 Generated with Claude Code
https://claude.ai/code/session_01WwKYDCqjM2FqYwY5ZNVvjb
* Harden MultiAuth: exception resilience, mcp_path propagation, test coverage
- verify_token now catches exceptions from individual sources and
continues to the next, so one broken verifier can't take down the
whole chain
- set_mcp_path propagates to verifiers, not just the server
- Fix jwks_url→jwks_uri typo in class docstring
- Add tests for raising verifiers, valid-token HTTP acceptance,
and set_mcp_path propagation
* Clean up MultiAuth: precompute sources, deduplicate test helpers
* Fix version badges to 3.1.0
---------
Co-authored-by: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
* Add consent binding cookie to prevent confused deputy attacks (GHSA-rww4-4w9c-7733)
The OAuthProxy's consent page verified user intent but didn't bind the
consenting browser to the IdP callback. An attacker could intercept the
upstream authorization URL after consent and send it to a victim, whose
browser would complete the flow without having the consent cookie.
This adds a signed consent binding cookie set during consent approval
(both manual and auto-approve paths) and verified in the IdP callback
handler. A different browser won't have this cookie and gets a 403.
* Use startswith for URL assertion in consent binding test
* Store consent bindings as per-transaction map to support parallel flows
* Only accept __Host- consent binding cookie on HTTPS
* chore: Update SDK documentation
---------
Co-authored-by: marvin-context-protocol[bot] <225465937+marvin-context-protocol[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
* Fix RFC 8414 path-aware authorization server metadata discovery
Override get_well_known_routes() in OAuthProvider to rewrite the
authorization server metadata route to be path-aware based on issuer_url,
matching how protected resource metadata already works.
Closes#2527
* Update readme
* Add consent_csp_policy parameter to OAuthProxy
Allows customization or disabling of CSP directives on the consent page.
Fixes#2476.
* Add consent_csp_policy to OIDCProxy and update docs
* Fix HTML injection vulnerability in CSP policy
HTML-escape the CSP policy value before inserting into meta tag to prevent HTML injection when CSP policies contain quotes.
* Add custom token verifier support to OIDCProxy
OIDCProxy now accepts an optional token_verifier parameter to support
non-JWT token formats like opaque tokens from providers such as Clerk.
When provided, the custom verifier is used instead of creating a default
JWTVerifier. Parameters that only apply to JWTVerifier creation (algorithm,
required_scopes) raise clear errors when specified alongside a custom
verifier. Parameters with other purposes (audience for OAuth flow,
timeout_seconds for config fetch) remain allowed.
The custom verifier's required_scopes are automatically loaded and
advertised through OAuth discovery endpoints.
* Document custom token verifier support in OIDC proxy
* Checkpoint progress
* Checkpoint progress
* add derive b64 method
* PR clean-up
* refactor da proxy
* Updates to tests
* Make jwt_signing_key required for oauth proxy
* use typing_extensions and fix tests
* PR Cleanup
* also adjust integration tests
* Update docs, use client secret to derive jwt signing key
* You win some you lose some, gg claude
* check for both in derive
* update documentation / clean up
* Update http.mdx
---------
Co-authored-by: Jeremiah Lowin <153965+jlowin@users.noreply.github.com>
* Add comprehensive keyring integration tests
Prevents OS keyring pollution during testing by adding a global mock in
conftest.py. Tests verify keyring behavior across platforms and fallback
scenarios without writing to the actual system keyring.
- Add global mock_keyring fixture to tests/conftest.py
- Add TestOAuthProxyKeyring class with 6 keyring-specific tests
- Remove try/except ImportError for keyring (now required dependency)
- Add keyring extra to py-key-value-aio dependency
- Clean up extraneous implementation comments in oauth_proxy.py
* Update OAuth keyring documentation
Update all OAuth-related documentation to reflect keyring-based key management:
- Add version badges to jwt_signing_key, token_encryption_key, and client_storage parameters
- Standardize "Default behavior (`None`):" formatting with backticks
- Ensure consistent messaging about development-only defaults across all docs
- Update oauth-proxy.mdx, oidc-proxy.mdx, http.mdx, storage-backends.mdx, and upgrade-guide.mdx
* Add optional authorization consent screen for OAuth providers
Adds `require_authorization_consent` parameter (default True) to OAuthProxy and all providers. When disabled, authorization skips the consent screen for local development/testing. Logs security warning when disabled.
* Update warning message to use 'authorization consent screen'
* Implement icon support in fastmcp
* Fix icon feature tests
- Update snapshot for ResourceTemplate to include icons field
- Remove OAuth mounting tests (belong to PR #2119, not this feature)
* Update docs
* Customize consent screen
* Use server website link if available
* Anchor link shouldnt have trailing slash
* Remove 'a FastMCP server named' from consent page message
* Update docs
* Add issuer_url parameter to OAuth providers for mounting scenarios
* Add get_well_known_routes
* Update docs
* Improve docs and tests
* Trigger CI
* Fix conditional test execution for Windows
