Screen templated resource parameters for path traversal by default (#4482)

* Add ResourceSecurity screening for templated resources (defaults on)

* Add tests for resource path-security screening

* Document resource path-security; fix ty in tests

* Carry child template security policy through provider mount

Preserve a mounted template's explicit ResourceSecurity (per-param
exemptions or a deliberate opt-out) through FastMCPProviderResourceTemplate.wrap
so the parent read chokepoint honours it instead of the parent default.

* Defer mcp SDK import so fastmcp.resources loads without the [mcp] extra

* Make resource path-security docs examples self-contained and runnable

* Match exempt_params under both hyphen and underscore spellings

Template placeholders like {git-ref} extract as git_ref, so an exemption
written with the natural URI-template spelling never matched.

* Docs: describe net-depth traversal rule accurately; make example runnable

The screening only rejects .. segments that escape the starting depth
(foo/../bar passes) — saying any standalone .. is rejected overstated
the guarantee. Also define DOCS_ROOT so the example runs.
This commit is contained in:
Jeremiah Lowin 2026-07-17 17:42:48 -04:00 committed by GitHub
commit d779414f8a
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG key ID: B5690EEEBB952194
12 changed files with 824 additions and 11 deletions

View file

@ -324,6 +324,14 @@ FastMCP keeps its own DCR redirect-URI hardening (PRs #4419, #4408) regardless o
*Verify:* recent commits `67527c1f` (block unsafe OAuth redirect schemes), `57a27992` (DNS rebinding), `cccb529f` (DCR redirect URI validation) on `main`.
### Templated resource parameters are path-screened by default — Breaking (behavior)
Every templated resource now has its extracted parameter values screened for path-traversal (`..` segments), absolute paths, and null bytes **before the handler runs** — on by default, at the server's read chokepoint, covering local and provider-sourced (mounted/proxied) templates alike. Previously these payloads reached handlers raw; a template whose parameter flowed into a filesystem path or upstream URL was exposed unless the author added their own check. A rejected read now surfaces a non-leaky "resource not found" error (`-32602`) and a debug log.
The check is component-based, matching the SDK's `contains_path_traversal`: only a standalone `..` segment is traversal, so values that merely contain dots (`HEAD~3..HEAD`, `file.tar.gz`) and dotfiles (`.env`) still pass. This can break a template that legitimately accepts `..`-bearing or absolute values — exempt the parameter with `ResourceSecurity(exempt_params={...})`, disable per-component with `security=None`, or set a server-wide default with `FastMCP(resource_security=...)`. See [Resources → Path Security](/servers/resources#path-security).
*Verify:* `fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/resources/security.py` (`ResourceSecurity`), the screening block in `FastMCP.read_resource` (`fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/server.py`), and `tests/resources/test_resource_security.py`.
## Removed in 4.0
Deprecations that warned in 3.x are removed in 4.0. Each entry below is a hard removal — the old surface raises `TypeError` / `AttributeError` rather than warning, unless noted otherwise.