diff --git a/docs/servers/authorization.mdx b/docs/servers/authorization.mdx
index 5481cbc2a..68bac9181 100644
--- a/docs/servers/authorization.mdx
+++ b/docs/servers/authorization.mdx
@@ -58,6 +58,75 @@ def read_write_operation() -> str:
     return "Read/write action completed"
 ```
 
+### require_roles
+
+<VersionBadge version="4.0.0" />
+
+Scopes are standardized, so `require_scopes` works the same everywhere. Roles and groups are not part of OIDC, so every identity provider puts them under a different claim. `require_roles` handles the comparison and takes an `extract` callable that tells it where to look.
+
+```python
+from fastmcp import FastMCP
+from fastmcp.server.auth import require_roles
+
+def keycloak_roles(claims: dict) -> list[str]:
+    return claims["realm_access"]["roles"]
+
+mcp = FastMCP("Role Server")
+
+@mcp.tool(auth=require_roles("admin", extract=keycloak_roles))
+def admin_operation() -> str:
+    """Requires the 'admin' role."""
+    return "Admin action completed"
+
+@mcp.tool(auth=require_roles("admin", "auditor", extract=keycloak_roles))
+def audited_admin_operation() -> str:
+    """Requires both the 'admin' AND 'auditor' roles."""
+    return "Audited admin action"
+```
+
+Multiple roles are required together, matching `require_scopes`. A token whose claims lack the path entirely is denied rather than raising, so the extractor can index directly.
+
+Keeping the claim path at the call site means any provider works, including ones with unusual shapes. Common locations:
+
+| Provider | Extractor |
+| --- | --- |
+| Keycloak | `lambda c: c["realm_access"]["roles"]` |
+| Microsoft Entra | `lambda c: c["roles"]` |
+| AWS Cognito | `lambda c: c["cognito:groups"]` |
+| Auth0 | `lambda c: c["permissions"]` |
+
+Verify the claim against your own tenant before relying on it. Auth0's namespaced custom claims are configured per tenant, and Entra emits `roles` or `groups` depending on the app manifest.
+
+<Note>
+`require_roles` cannot signal a scope shortfall, because OAuth has no way to request a role. A role denial surfaces as a plain `AuthorizationError` rather than one of the `insufficient_scope` challenges described in [Signaling Scope Shortfalls](#signaling-scope-shortfalls), and it suppresses any scope shortfall raised alongside it — a caller blocked by their role should not be told to go obtain a scope that would not help them. Combining `require_roles` with `require_scopes` is otherwise fine: whenever the role check passes, a scope shortfall is reported as usual.
+</Note>
+
+### Checking Other Claims
+
+`require_roles` is a convenience for the common case. `AccessToken.claims` holds every claim from the token, so gating on anything else needs no special API — just an auth check that reads it.
+
+```python
+from fastmcp import FastMCP
+from fastmcp.server.auth import AuthCheck, AuthContext
+
+mcp = FastMCP("Claim Server")
+
+def require_tenant(tenant_id: str) -> AuthCheck:
+    """Require the token to come from a specific tenant."""
+    def check(ctx: AuthContext) -> bool:
+        if ctx.token is None:
+            return False
+        return ctx.token.claims.get("tid") == tenant_id
+    return check
+
+@mcp.tool(auth=require_tenant("acme"))
+def tenant_operation() -> str:
+    """Only callable by tokens issued for the acme tenant."""
+    return "Tenant action completed"
+```
+
+The same caveat applies: a check like this is opaque, so it suppresses scope disclosure for its siblings.
+
 ### restrict_tag
 
 Tag-based restrictions apply scope requirements conditionally. If a component has the specified tag, the token must have the required scopes. Components without the tag are unaffected.
@@ -107,7 +176,7 @@ Any callable that accepts `AuthContext` and returns `bool` can serve as an auth
 
 ```python
 from fastmcp import FastMCP
-from fastmcp.server.auth import AuthContext
+from fastmcp.server.auth import AuthCheck, AuthContext
 
 mcp = FastMCP("Custom Auth Server")
 
@@ -117,7 +186,7 @@ def require_premium_user(ctx: AuthContext) -> bool:
         return False
     return ctx.token.claims.get("premium", False) is True
 
-def require_access_level(minimum_level: int):
+def require_access_level(minimum_level: int) -> AuthCheck:
     """Factory function for level-based authorization."""
     def check(ctx: AuthContext) -> bool:
         if ctx.token is None:
@@ -417,6 +486,7 @@ from fastmcp.server.auth import (
     AuthContext,       # Context with .token, .component
     AuthCheck,         # Type alias: sync or async Callable[[AuthContext], bool]
     require_scopes,    # Built-in: requires specific scopes
+    require_roles,     # Built-in: requires roles read from token claims
     restrict_tag,      # Built-in: tag-based scope requirements
     run_auth_checks,   # Utility: run checks with AND logic
 )
diff --git a/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/auth/__init__.py b/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/auth/__init__.py
index 67ee25915..d0a2953e9 100644
--- a/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/auth/__init__.py
+++ b/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/auth/__init__.py
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ from .auth import (
 from .authorization import (
     AuthCheck,
     AuthContext,
+    require_roles,
     require_scopes,
     restrict_tag,
     run_auth_checks,
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ __all__ = [
     "RemoteAuthProvider",
     "StaticTokenVerifier",
     "TokenVerifier",
+    "require_roles",
     "require_scopes",
     "restrict_tag",
     "run_auth_checks",
diff --git a/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/auth/authorization.py b/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/auth/authorization.py
index 236db2051..b6e731a2e 100644
--- a/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/auth/authorization.py
+++ b/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/server/auth/authorization.py
@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
 from fastmcp.utilities.authorization import (
     AuthCheck,
     AuthContext,
+    require_roles,
     require_scopes,
     restrict_tag,
     run_auth_checks,
@@ -13,6 +14,7 @@ from fastmcp.utilities.authorization import (
 __all__ = [
     "AuthCheck",
     "AuthContext",
+    "require_roles",
     "require_scopes",
     "restrict_tag",
     "run_auth_checks",
diff --git a/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/utilities/authorization.py b/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/utilities/authorization.py
index 433644c9e..5ae4ae184 100644
--- a/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/utilities/authorization.py
+++ b/fastmcp_slim/fastmcp/utilities/authorization.py
@@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 
 import inspect
 import logging
-from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable
+from collections.abc import Awaitable, Callable, Iterable
 from dataclasses import dataclass
-from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, cast
+from typing import TYPE_CHECKING, Any, cast
 
 from fastmcp.exceptions import AuthorizationError
 
@@ -104,11 +104,96 @@ class _RestrictTag(_ScopeAwareCheck):
         return set(self.required_scopes) - set(ctx.token.scopes)
 
 
+class _RequireRoles:
+    """Callable auth check requiring all of a fixed set of roles.
+
+    Deliberately not a :class:`_ScopeAwareCheck`. Roles are not scopes and
+    cannot be requested through OAuth, so a shortfall has no spec-correct
+    step-up representation.
+    """
+
+    def __init__(
+        self,
+        roles: tuple[str, ...],
+        extract: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], Iterable[str]],
+    ) -> None:
+        self.required_roles: frozenset[str] = frozenset(roles)
+        self._extract = extract
+
+    def __call__(self, ctx: AuthContext) -> bool:
+        if ctx.token is None:
+            return False
+        try:
+            extracted = self._extract(ctx.token.claims)
+            # A provider that stores a single role as a bare string satisfies
+            # `Iterable[str]`, but iterating it yields characters: "admin"
+            # would deny an "admin" requirement and grant an "a" one. Treat a
+            # string as the single role it plainly means.
+            if isinstance(extracted, str):
+                extracted = [extracted]
+            granted = set(extracted)
+        except (KeyError, IndexError, TypeError):
+            # A caller whose token simply lacks the claim is an ordinary
+            # denial, not a broken check: return False rather than letting
+            # `_evaluate_check` log a warning on every unauthorized request.
+            return False
+        return self.required_roles.issubset(granted)
+
+
 def require_scopes(*scopes: str) -> AuthCheck:
     """Require all of the given OAuth scopes."""
     return _RequireScopes(scopes)
 
 
+def require_roles(
+    *roles: str,
+    extract: Callable[[dict[str, Any]], Iterable[str]],
+) -> AuthCheck:
+    """Require all of the given roles, read from the token's claims.
+
+    Roles and groups are not part of OIDC, so every identity provider puts them
+    somewhere different: `realm_access.roles` on Keycloak, `roles` on Microsoft
+    Entra, `cognito:groups` on AWS Cognito, `permissions` or a namespaced custom
+    claim on Auth0. `extract` receives the token's claims and returns the
+    caller's roles, which keeps that provider-specific knowledge at the call
+    site instead of guessing it here.
+
+    ```python
+    from fastmcp.server.auth import require_roles
+
+    keycloak = require_roles("admin", extract=lambda c: c["realm_access"]["roles"])
+    cognito = require_roles("admins", extract=lambda c: c["cognito:groups"])
+    ```
+
+    A token missing the claim entirely is denied rather than treated as an
+    error, so `extract` may index into the claims without guarding. An
+    extractor returning a bare string is treated as one role, since a provider
+    that stores a single role as a scalar is common.
+
+    Unlike `require_scopes`, this check cannot signal a shortfall: OAuth has no
+    way to request a role, so there is no `insufficient_scope` challenge to
+    emit. A role denial is therefore reported as a plain `AuthorizationError`,
+    and it suppresses any scope shortfall alongside it — a caller blocked by
+    their role must not be told to go obtain a scope that would not help.
+    Scope shortfalls are still reported normally whenever the role check
+    passes.
+
+    Args:
+        *roles: Roles the caller must hold. All are required (AND logic).
+        extract: Callable mapping the token's claims to the caller's roles.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: If no roles are given, which would allow any authenticated
+            caller and is more likely a mistake than an intent.
+    """
+    if not roles:
+        raise ValueError(
+            "require_roles() needs at least one role; a check with no roles "
+            "would admit any authenticated caller."
+        )
+    return _RequireRoles(roles, extract)
+
+
 def restrict_tag(tag: str, *, scopes: list[str]) -> AuthCheck:
     """Require scopes when the accessed component has a specific tag."""
     return _RestrictTag(tag, scopes)
diff --git a/tests/server/auth/test_authorization.py b/tests/server/auth/test_authorization.py
index 7060a978c..b3f268806 100644
--- a/tests/server/auth/test_authorization.py
+++ b/tests/server/auth/test_authorization.py
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ from fastmcp.exceptions import AuthorizationError, InsufficientScopeError
 from fastmcp.server.auth import (
     AccessToken,
     AuthContext,
+    require_roles,
     require_scopes,
     restrict_tag,
     run_auth_checks,
@@ -19,6 +20,7 @@ from fastmcp.server.auth import (
 from fastmcp.server.middleware import AuthMiddleware
 from fastmcp.server.transforms import ToolTransform
 from fastmcp.tools.tool_transform import ToolTransformConfig, TransformedTool
+from fastmcp.utilities.authorization import scope_requirements
 from fastmcp.utilities.versions import VersionSpec
 
 # =============================================================================
@@ -26,14 +28,17 @@ from fastmcp.utilities.versions import VersionSpec
 # =============================================================================
 
 
-def make_token(scopes: list[str] | None = None) -> AccessToken:
+def make_token(
+    scopes: list[str] | None = None,
+    claims: dict | None = None,
+) -> AccessToken:
     """Create a test access token."""
     return AccessToken(
         token="test-token",
         client_id="test-client",
         scopes=scopes or [],
         expires_at=None,
-        claims={},
+        claims=claims or {},
     )
 
 
@@ -86,6 +91,155 @@ class TestRequireScopes:
         assert check(ctx) is False
 
 
+# =============================================================================
+# Tests for require_roles
+# =============================================================================
+
+
+KEYCLOAK = {"realm_access": {"roles": ["admin", "viewer"]}}
+
+
+def keycloak_roles(claims: dict) -> list[str]:
+    return claims["realm_access"]["roles"]
+
+
+class TestRequireRoles:
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "claims, extract",
+        [
+            (KEYCLOAK, keycloak_roles),
+            ({"roles": ["admin"]}, lambda c: c["roles"]),
+            ({"cognito:groups": ["admin"]}, lambda c: c["cognito:groups"]),
+            ({"permissions": ["admin"]}, lambda c: c["permissions"]),
+            (
+                {"https://app.example.com/roles": ["admin"]},
+                lambda c: c["https://app.example.com/roles"],
+            ),
+        ],
+    )
+    def test_reads_roles_from_provider_specific_claim(self, claims, extract):
+        ctx = AuthContext(token=make_token(claims=claims), component=make_tool())
+        assert require_roles("admin", extract=extract)(ctx) is True
+
+    def test_requires_all_roles(self):
+        ctx = AuthContext(token=make_token(claims=KEYCLOAK), component=make_tool())
+        check = require_roles("admin", "viewer", extract=keycloak_roles)
+        assert check(ctx) is True
+
+    def test_denies_when_one_role_missing(self):
+        ctx = AuthContext(token=make_token(claims=KEYCLOAK), component=make_tool())
+        check = require_roles("admin", "auditor", extract=keycloak_roles)
+        assert check(ctx) is False
+
+    def test_denies_without_token(self):
+        ctx = AuthContext(token=None, component=make_tool())
+        assert require_roles("admin", extract=keycloak_roles)(ctx) is False
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "claims",
+        [{}, {"realm_access": {}}, {"realm_access": None}, {"realm_access": []}],
+    )
+    def test_denies_when_claim_absent_or_malformed(self, claims):
+        """A token without the claim is an ordinary denial, not a broken check."""
+        ctx = AuthContext(token=make_token(claims=claims), component=make_tool())
+        assert require_roles("admin", extract=keycloak_roles)(ctx) is False
+
+    def test_rejects_empty_role_list(self):
+        """A check with no roles would admit any authenticated caller."""
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="at least one role"):
+            require_roles(extract=keycloak_roles)
+
+    def test_is_opaque_to_scope_shortfall(self):
+        """Roles cannot be requested via OAuth, so they yield no step-up."""
+        ctx = AuthContext(token=make_token(claims=KEYCLOAK), component=make_tool())
+        check = require_roles("auditor", extract=keycloak_roles)
+        assert scope_requirements(check, ctx) is None
+
+    def test_suppresses_shortfall_disclosure_of_sibling_scope_checks(self):
+        """One opaque check withholds the whole list's scope requirements."""
+        token = make_token(scopes=["read"], claims=KEYCLOAK)
+        ctx = AuthContext(token=token, component=make_tool())
+        checks = [
+            require_scopes("write"),
+            require_roles("admin", extract=keycloak_roles),
+        ]
+        assert scope_requirements(checks, ctx) is None
+        assert scope_requirements([require_scopes("write")], ctx) == ["write"]
+
+    @pytest.mark.parametrize(
+        "required, expected",
+        [("admin", True), ("a", False), ("dmin", False)],
+    )
+    def test_scalar_role_claim_is_one_role(self, required: str, expected: bool):
+        """A provider storing one role as a string must not be iterated.
+
+        `str` satisfies `Iterable[str]`, so a bare "admin" would otherwise
+        become the character set {a, d, m, i, n} — denying the "admin" it
+        plainly grants and granting any single character it contains.
+        """
+        ctx = AuthContext(
+            token=make_token(claims={"role": "admin"}), component=make_tool()
+        )
+        check = require_roles(required, extract=lambda c: c["role"])
+        assert check(ctx) is expected
+
+    async def test_role_denial_suppresses_scope_challenge(self):
+        """A caller blocked by their role is not told to obtain a scope."""
+        mcp = FastMCP(
+            middleware=[
+                AuthMiddleware(
+                    auth=[
+                        require_scopes("api"),
+                        require_roles("admin", extract=keycloak_roles),
+                    ]
+                )
+            ]
+        )
+
+        @mcp.tool
+        def t() -> str:
+            return "ok"
+
+        token = make_token(scopes=["read"], claims={"realm_access": {"roles": ["v"]}})
+        tok = set_token(token)
+        try:
+            with pytest.raises(AuthorizationError) as exc_info:
+                await mcp.call_tool("t", {})
+        finally:
+            auth_context_var.reset(tok)
+
+        assert not isinstance(exc_info.value, InsufficientScopeError)
+
+    async def test_passing_role_still_allows_scope_challenge(self):
+        """Mixing the two checks does not disable step-up on its own."""
+        mcp = FastMCP(
+            middleware=[
+                AuthMiddleware(
+                    auth=[
+                        require_scopes("api"),
+                        require_roles("admin", extract=keycloak_roles),
+                    ]
+                )
+            ]
+        )
+
+        @mcp.tool
+        def t() -> str:
+            return "ok"
+
+        token = make_token(
+            scopes=["read"], claims={"realm_access": {"roles": ["admin"]}}
+        )
+        tok = set_token(token)
+        try:
+            with pytest.raises(InsufficientScopeError) as exc_info:
+                await mcp.call_tool("t", {})
+        finally:
+            auth_context_var.reset(tok)
+
+        assert exc_info.value.required_scopes == ["api"]
+
+
 # =============================================================================
 # Tests for restrict_tag
 # =============================================================================